

TRANSNATIONALISM AND

THE TWO IMPERIAL

PORT-CITIES OF ASIA:

A COMPARATIVE SOCIAL

HISTORY OF İZMİR AND

SHANGHAI IN GLOBAL HISTORY*

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▲ A B S T R A C T

This article aims to analyse the social history and political economy of two imperial port-cities of İzmir and Shanghai from the perspective of *laissez faire* transnationalism since the mid-19th century. We show that transnationalism is the key transformative global phenomenon that promoted both the rise and fall of İzmir and Shanghai to a global city status and connected the social history of both cities with global history, international relations and international political economy. We deal with the questions of whether İzmir and Shanghai, despite their distant geographical locations and cultural settings, respond in a similar way to the transnational penetration and whether they ended

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up with similar economic, political and social outcomes/consequences. We also demonstrate the legacy of transnationalism in both cities at present and discuss the prospects for the future.

Keywords: Transnational Relations, State, Non-State Actors, Civil Society, Transnational Macrocism

Transnasyonalizm ve Asya'nın İki Emperyal Liman Kenti: İzmir ve Şanghay'ın Küresel Tarih İçerisinde Karşılaştırmalı Toplumsal Tarihi

Ö Z E T

Bu makale emperyal liman kentleri olan İzmir ve Şanghay'ın toplumsal tarihlerini ve siyasal iktisatlarını 19. yüzyıldan itibaren *laissez faire* dönemi *transnasyonal* ilişkiler perspektifinden karşılaştırmayı ve tahlil etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale, coğrafi uzaklıkları ve kültürel farklılıklarına rağmen İzmir ve Şanghay'ın, *transnasyonalizm* nüfuz etmesine benzer bir şekilde tepki verip vermediklerine ve benzer ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal sonuçlarla karşılaşmış, karşılaşmadıklarını sorgulamaktadır. Makale *transnasyonalizmi* dönüştürücü, merkezi küresel bir olgu olarak tanımlamakta, İzmir ve Şanghay'ın "küresel şehir" olarak yükselişine sonra da düşüşüne neden olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu şekilde *transnasyonalizmin* her iki şehrin toplumsal tarihini, "küresel tarih", "uluslararası ilişkiler" ve "uluslararası siyasal iktisat" ile birleştirdiği iddia edilmektedir. Makale aynı zamanda *transnasyonal ilişkilerin* her iki şehirde günümüze bıraktığı mirası göstermekte ve geleceğe yönelik bir tartışma da yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Transnasyonal ilişkiler, Devlet, Devlet Dışı Aktörler, Sivil Toplum, Transnasyonal Dünya

Introduction

The 19th century was the era of a large-scale historical transformation. The end of the Napoleonic Wars led to unprecedented changes that influenced even the remote regions of the world. At the start of the Industrial Revolution a global capitalist order based on "free trade" and "peaceful business" was launched as a "universal interest".¹ However the dissemination of the idea and practice of "free trade" and "peaceful business" was not necessarily carried out by peaceful means. A combination of power and diplomacy used to persuade a number of countries. While the military muscles of the chief beneficiaries pushed the cause of free trade all over the world, unequal commercial treaties and treaty-port agreements were imposed on weaker polities through diplomacy. And in each case, it involved derogation of sovereignty. In this way, incorporation of new territories into the capitalist world order was accomplished either through colonization or through peripheralization of the economically autonomous empires such as the Ottoman and the Chinese.² There were different motivations for penetrating into different lands. However, what specific means to be used to penetrate into a new territory was largely determined by the character of the local actors' response to the world economy in the making. Accordingly, the opportunities and obstacles resulting from the transformative processes varied in different geographies depending on the way the actors and agents of the new order communicated with various local actors and interests.

¹ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (1944; repr., Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

² Immanuel Wallerstein, *The capitalist world-economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

The 19th century overseas commercial expansion of the West restructured the political geography of world commerce on the ideology of “free trade imperialism”.³ Backed by the coercive naval apparatus the new order also employed distinctive instruments to expand into the overseas territories. On one hand, political and economic diplomacy was increasingly used either for “peaceful” incorporation of the new lands or to compel the local authorities to behave accordingly. On the other, *transnational relations and actors*⁴ became an important unofficial, non-military means accelerating the expansion and the consolidation of the new order in new territories even in cases when the local actors did not embrace them. Indeed, a significant variable that shaped the character and spirit of both the intervention and the consequent local response, and facilitated or hindered the process of incorporation during and after the penetration was how powerful and rooted were the *transnational interests* in the local polity, economy and society. The direct use of naval power became the last resort but exercised in cases of strong resistance against incorporation. The Western powers acknowledged that the power of the market and its private actors (merchants and financiers) were non-violent and as effective instruments as the power and the capabilities of the chartered companies or navies. Linking individuals and private companies to their overseas counterparts became an effective instrument to increase national wealth, power and prestige at home and abroad. In time, although the increasing number of private actors intensified the competition over the new markets, the rivalries did not lead to the customary inter-state warfare. Even when the capitalist struggles among business enterprises escalated, the “peace interest” and the “peaceful business” prevailed until the early 20th century.

Port-cities were the epicenters of transnational relations in the non-European spaces. The 19th century transnationalism did not only construct novel social structures in these zones but transmitted its legacy and spirit to the future political, economic and social texture of these spaces. In such spaces one can observe similarities, as well as particularities, about the short- and long-term impacts of transnationalism in a historical continuum, and port-cities while strikingly resembled to each other have tended to produce divergent forms of social characteristics and practices from their greater national habitats. İzmir and Shanghai, the two main imperial port-cities located at the two ends of Asia during the Ottoman and Qing dynasties are the two genuine spaces providing us relevant cases for a comparative study in historical sociology, international relations and transnationalism. Historically, their prominence increased steadily and reached its peak during the second half of the 19th century when the free trade gained further momentum. And as the commercial cargos transported mainly through maritime trade, sea lanes and port-cities became the most important avenues and spaces connecting

³ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (London: Verso, 1994).

⁴ It is worth remembering that there is no straight definition and fixed meaning of *transnational* and *transnationalism*. See Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (November 2005), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777305002705>; and Susan Strange, “The Study of Transnational Relations,” *International Affairs* 52, no. 3 (July 1976), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2616549>. In this article transnational phenomenon refers to the relations between state to non-state, and non-state to non-state entities in global history. See the section on transnational relations below. Here, the article does not refer to transnational phenomenon in terms of a global production pattern, creating transnational classes in parallel to or superimposed on the national classes. On the other hand, the adjective *international*, and the concept *international relations* is conventionally understood as relations between states influenced by politics, economy, history, geography, and technology. In fact, we believe that international relations are a misnomer since the relations are not among nations but states. Thus, we prefer to use the term *inter-state* (or *inter-governmental*) relations instead.

the people and incorporating the remote regions of the world economy to each other. In this process, İzmir and Shanghai became glamorous showcases of the new global order in the East.

Transnationalism, as a historical concept, shows us the strengths and weaknesses of states vis-à-vis non-state actors. Here, we focus on how to think about transnational phenomena in relation to global history. We formulate the question as whether the social and local history of İzmir and Shanghai can best be understood comparatively and in relation to various facets of transnational process. This article introduces the reader to the similar transnational experiences and social histories of İzmir and Shanghai comparatively in relation to the evolving nature of transnationalism, and shows that as a global phenomenon, 19th century transnationalism shaped and reshaped the social structures and relations in both cities in the historical process and, even after it ceased to exist, left its mark on the social texture of İzmir and Shanghai that survives at present. There is no comparative study available on İzmir and Shanghai in the literature of port-cities.⁵ A purpose of this article therefore is to fill this gap by focusing on the global history, transnationalism and port-cities. In this context, we start by defining and discussing the meaning, actors and the settings of transnational phenomena and showing the interaction patterns between the state and private actors in the process of establishing a transnational domain. Then we argue the critical role that the states and inter-state relations (diplomacy and war) played in the establishment of transnational domains in the Ottoman and Chinese empires. We go on by arguing that a collection of attributes also came together and brought into a relationship to create a “transnational space” (“global-city”) in İzmir and Shanghai: an advantageous geographical location and a fertile hinterland endowed with semi-material assets, e.g., regional and global transportation and communication systems; relatively liberal local administrative arrangements and demographic and cultural diversity.⁶ In the remaining part of this article we deal with the transnational experiences of İzmir and Shanghai comparatively between the mid-19th and early 21st centuries: the evolving and changing relations between the “state and private”, and “foreign and local private” actors at different phases of global -and imperial- histories in relation to transnationalism, and their impacts on the social structures and relations.

Transnational Relations as an “Unofficial” Phenomenon

In the 1970s *transnational relations* was conceptualized as “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments”; and *transnational interactions* described as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international organization”.⁷ However, transnationalism is not a recent phenomenon that

⁵ However, there is one major work in field of comparative history and international relations of the Ottoman and Chinese empires in the age of imperialism. See Reşat Kasaba, “Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of World History* 4, no. 2 (Fall 1993), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078561>.

⁶ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Is Global Shanghai ‘Good to Think’? Thoughts on Comparative History and Post-Socialist Cities,” *Journal of World History* 18, no. 2 (June 2007), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20079423>.

⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

came out in the 1970s. Historically, private actors have commonly entered into interactions with each other and the states across political boundaries.⁸ In parallel to *inter-state relations*, transnational relations have been known as unofficial, societal intercourse with political, economic and social consequences. In contrast to the soldiers and diplomats, and the use of force, violence and blackmailing, transnational relations have involved in establishing commercial, financial, business and cultural contacts and communications across political boundaries via merchants, bankers, artists, other professionals or individuals and groups. Under “democratic” and “free trade” orders people have tended to develop “civil society” domestically and “transnational relations” internationally.⁹ Then those *transnational entities who control significant resources* have become autonomous actors and are able to affect the course of domestic and international developments either collaborating with or struggling against other non-state and the state actors. Through direct interactions with other people and groups they disseminate new ideas, norms, and lifestyles; change the perceptions, opinions and behaviours of people; transform the domestic and international structures and patterns of interactions.¹⁰

The states are the integral part of transnationalism. The success of transnational penetration is likely to depend on the relative powers of the target state and civil society; the existence of like-minded domestic and/or governmental actors; and the ability of transnational actors to end up with winning policy coalitions.¹¹ First of all, it is the governmental actors’ discretion to admit or not the foreign non-state actors into a country, and enable them to carry out transnational activities with domestic societal actors by granting visas, licences, security, property rights and stable legal environment. It is likely that the more centralized and stronger the state, the more difficult for transnational actors to obtain easy access; and the less centralized and powerful the state, the easier to enter into a national domain. However, in either case, obtaining physical access by itself does not mean effective penetration unless establishing successful transnational coalitions with local and/or governmental actors in the target country, which often requires adjustment to some norms and demands of local interest groups.

A significant aspect of transnational phenomena has been its ability to transform the social fabric through transmitting and implanting new ideas, cultural habits and behavioural patterns. Historically, transnational actors while incorporating local elements and culture for successful partnerships, have created hybridized, cosmopolitan urban centres and introduced modern urban way of life that strongly attracted local communities or caused resentment among others. Another substantial impact of transnational contacts and/or coalitions on the society has been to strengthen the civil society and legitimize the activities of weak domestic groups and generate new seats of power. In such cases, strong local reactions and counter coalitions are likely to emerge and even lead to violent confrontations among the established and new rival interests under the cover of religious, ethnic or other social divisions.

⁸ F. S. Northedge, “Transnationalism: The American Illusion,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1976), <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298760050010201>; Stephen D. Krasner, “Power politics, institutions, and transnational relations,” in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁹ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 187.

¹⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations*.

¹¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 25-26.

Historically, both states and transnational actors have relied on each other to promote their own capabilities and interests.¹² The states are not continually capable of operating across borders on their own and thus find transnational relations as useful and effective channels in pursuit of wealth and power. Transnational actors collect information and enable the states to keep close watch over the activities of the other states, provide policy relevant ideas, and foster economic growth and development. On the other, transnational actors rely on states for their existence, security and protecting and promoting their interests *vis-a-vis* other states and non-state actors. The states and non-state actors increase each other's capabilities to influence the course of events at the societal, governmental and international domains.

Here, we need an understanding of the role played by the states (through diplomacy and war) in getting ready the Ottoman and Chinese lands (eventually, İzmir and Shanghai) for the 19th century transnationalism.

Diplomacy and War: Preparing the Stage for Transnationalism¹³

The Ottoman and Chinese empires responded contrastingly to their subordinate incorporation into the 19th century world economy: The declining Ottomans, given their geographical location and perennial interactions with the Europeans reacted less controversially than the highly assertive Chinese Empire.¹⁴ Eventually, while the Ottomans were incorporated into the new order through “peaceful” means (treaties and reforms) the incorporation of the Chinese preceded successive wars.

In the Ottoman Empire the pressures, and the military threats coming from Russia and the Viceroy Mohammed Ali of Egypt against the territorial integrity of the Empire and the authority of Sultan were played an important role in the process of incorporation. The British offered the Ottomans military and diplomatic support against Mohammed Ali and Russia in return for an Anglo-Ottoman Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1838 and extended to the other European states via the MFN clause. With the Agreement all local monopolies and protectionist trade measures in the Empire were abolished and Britain effectively controlled the increasing Russian influence in the Near East. The following modernizing *Tanzimat* (Reorganization) and *Islahat* (Reform) Edicts of 1839 and 1856, followed by the succession of laws and decrees on citizenship, local administration, judiciary, foreign investment, external and internal borrowings, property rights and land-ownership, and in 1876 the declaration of Constitutional Monarchy (*Meşrutiyet*) reorganized the Ottoman economic, political and social structures. The result was

¹² Krasner, “Power politics;” Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 280-313.

¹³ See Kasaba, “Treaties and Friendships;” Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988); Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye*, vol. 4, *Âyânlar; Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016); İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (2000; repr., London: Frank Cass, 2002); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dönüşen Dünya - Küresel 19. Yüzyıl Tarihi*, trans. Mustafa Tüzel (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2022); and Marie-Claire Bergère, *Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

¹⁴ See Kasaba, “Treaties and Friendships.”

the booming commercial, financial and investment activities between Europe and the Ottoman Empire; expansion of free trade and capitalist market economy; equality of Muslims and non-Muslims; the protection of the lives and properties of foreigners and their local representatives in the Empire. The Free Trade Agreement and the subsequent reforms delineated the political, judicial, social and institutional principles and the norms of the new order. However, in a few decades the Ottoman State went bankrupt, and a supranational European financial control was established over the Empire.

Diplomacy was a crucial instrument of bargaining and applying pressure over the Ottomans in the signing of the Free Trade Agreement; proclamation of successive political, economic and judicial reforms; and obtaining privileges for business. All these agreements and reforms were concluded at a time of military and/or fiscal difficulties looming over the Ottoman Palace. Beside the diplomatic power, the military power of the West was instrumental to shape the course of events in and around the Empire. The military power was not used against the Ottomans but to maintain its territorial integrity against the rival powers. Their main concern was the Russian expansionism at the expense of the Ottomans and its control of the trade routes in the Near East. The Ottoman connection was crucial to stop the Russian access to the Mediterranean. Here, British diplomatic and military power played a decisive role in supporting the Ottomans in the battleground and at the table: For example, the 1833 Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty, by which the Ottoman Empire was tacitly subordinated to a protectorate of Russia, was invalidated by the diplomatic power of Britain. Then, the 1838 Free Trade Agreement and 1839 Tanzimat Edict came soon after the defeat of the secessionist Viceroy of Egypt with the help of British military assistance. The defeat of the Viceroy also put an end to his protectionist and independent industrialisation project in Egypt and Syria which was conflicting with the British free trade imperialism in the Near East. Next, in 1853 after the Russian occupation of the Ottoman Black Sea and Danubian principalities, Britain and France fought together with the Ottomans against the Russians in the 1853-56 Crimean War and provided the Ottomans a firm political and diplomatic support during the consequent Paris Peace Negotiations. The 1856 Treaty of Paris settlement, while maintaining the integrity of the Empire, opened the Danube and the Black Sea to the free navigation of all merchant vessels and ensured the free penetration of Western products into the traditional Russian export markets. The 1856 Ottoman Reform Edict, which was declared just after the armistice of the Crimean War, provided full legal equality to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire in ownership, commercial, judicial, educational and public security domains. And during the 1877-78 Turco-Russian War, the Russians reached to the gates of Istanbul and ended the Ottoman control over the Balkans with the Treaty of San Stefano. The British who alarmed about the disastrous defeat of the Ottomans sent a fleet to Istanbul and forced the Russians to renegotiate the Treaty at a European conference. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin redressed the political map of the Balkans drawn up at San Stefano in favour of the Ottomans. In return, Britain was granted the right to occupy the Island of Cyprus which established an effective British control in the eastern Mediterranean and over the Suez Canal and the trade routes to India and East Asia. However, since the Crimean War the accrued external and internal debts of the Ottoman Empire to cover the military and state expenditures reached far beyond the state capacity to meet their service. The inability of the Ottomans to honour their financial obligations, led to the establishment of the foreign controlled High Council of the Treasury (1858), then High Council of Finances (1860) and finally the Ottoman Public

Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*) in 1881 for the control of the state revenues and fiscal administration of the Ottoman Empire until the establishment of Modern Turkey in 1923.¹⁵

The timing of the subordinate incorporation of the Qing Empire within the world economy overlapped with that of the Ottomans.¹⁶ The process of incorporation, however, was accomplished through direct use of military power against the Chinese. The main problem was the chronic trade deficit of the West with China. In order to reverse this imbalance and the flow of wealth from West to East the British, who now discovered a fertile market only for opium among the Chinese, began to transport large amounts of Indian opium to China. By the 1830s, the Chinese Court realized that the opium trade was emptying the imperial treasury, devastating financial and fiscal stability, as well as destroying the social fabric by dramatically increasing the number of opium addicts. The imperial response was to declare an edict abolishing the opium trade in 1838, at the time the Anglo-Ottoman Free Trade Agreement was signed. Although the Chinese did not suppress foreign trade for other commercial goods the British did not cooperate but instead began to smuggle opium to China. When China confiscated massive amounts of smuggled opium and detained the smugglers the British did not hesitate to intervene militarily. In 1839, the year the *Tanzimat* reform was declared in the Ottoman Empire, the First Opium War broke out and lasted until the defeat of China. The war officially ended with the Nanjing Treaty in 1842. Among others, the Treaty abolished the tariffs and protectionist measures by opening five Chinese ports, including Shanghai, for free trade and the settlement of foreigners; granted extra-territoriality to Westerners by exempting them from local jurisdiction and Hong Kong (reminding of Ottoman Cyprus) was ceded to Britain. The British objective of expanding free trade to the rest of China, and the Chinese reluctance to observe the conditions of the treaties led to the Second Opium War in 1856, at exactly the same time with the end of the Crimean War and the declaration of the second reform movement (*Islahat*) in the Ottoman Empire. After a series of wars the Chinese were defeated once again and with the Treaty of Beijing of 1860 the British and other Western powers further penetrated into the Chinese economic and social order: The Treaty granted the merchants and foreigners the right to travel freely all over China; allowed opening of a number of new ports for foreign trade and the navigation of foreign vessels on the Yangtze River; granted the freedom of religion and the right to own property to the Christians; ceded the Kowloon region neighbouring Hong Kong and a coastal area in Manchuria (today's Vladivostok) to Britain and Russia respectively; and allowed the Western powers to open diplomatic missions in Beijing. Once again, similar to the Ottoman experience, The Maritime Customs Administration of China became essentially a Western controlled institution by 1895 and strictly supervised the economy and the revenue collection of the Empire to meet the service of the war indemnities and foreign loans provided mainly by an international banking consortium.¹⁷ The Customs Administration operated until the establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949.

Nevertheless, diplomacy and war did not tell us the whole story about the establishment of transnationalism in the Ottoman and Chinese lands. They set the political and institutional

15 Herbert Feis, *Europe, the World's Banker, 1870-1914* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1964), 313-18.

16 See Kasaba, "Treaties and Friendships."

17 Feis, *Europe*, 437-61.

background to the governmental and private actors to conduct transnational activities. What needed further was to find the suitable locations endowed with essential material and semi-material attributes that would enable transnationalism to consolidate itself.¹⁸ 19th century İzmir and Shanghai were such places for transnationalism to be flourished.

Material and Semi-Material Factors of Transnationalism in İzmir and Shanghai

The Geographical Location

The physical location of İzmir and Shanghai had a decisive influence on their spectacular rise in the mid-19th century. Their dominant positions in the Ottoman and Qing economies respectively were partly due to their favourable geographical locations and natural assets, and partly to the transportation systems. Geographically, both cities were possessed of sheltered ports suitable for overseas commercial activities and adjacent to the plains of large agricultural production zones surrounded by major waterways. These advantageous material conditions, combined with their traditional economic activities, granted both İzmir and Shanghai a superior position over overseas, coastal and inland trade of their respective empires. In fact, both were known as important regional ports at least since the 17th century. However, a structural development for their rise in the mid-19th century was the growth of interest in the West on long distance oceanic trade that led both İzmir and Shanghai to become main transnational commercial sea ports and the “principal emporiums of eastern and western Asia” respectively.

İzmir faces the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the Gediz and Menderes deltas to the east. The agricultural and natural goods produced in the Menderes and Gediz delta regions and the raw materials extracted, and other goods produced in the Anatolian hinterland and even in Iran, found their ways to international markets from İzmir. The port of İzmir was the main gateway for the Ottoman exports to Europe and the European manufactured goods that reached the Anatolian and Asian markets. İzmir was a major location for overseas maritime trade which enabled the city to establish multiple links between the East and the West. Shanghai, on the other hand, faces to the Pacific Ocean to the east and the Yangtze delta to the west. Similarly, the outstanding geographical location of Shanghai, being the juncture for the sea, river and land transportation converted the city into the most important commercial port of South China that firmly connected the Empire with Asia and Europe. Shanghai, controlling the outlet of Yangtze River and its delta region of huge cultivated agricultural area acted as the endpoint of a vast network of agricultural and industrial producers in the hinterland.

Semi-Material Requirements

Free trade imperialism, a by-product of industrial revolution, was based on investing in capital goods industries at home and keeping the domestic market open to the foodstuffs and raw materials from around the world. Thus, the iron, steel and mechanized textile products of the West found increasing demand in the world markets, while the world producers of primary goods increased their production to penetrate further in the Western markets and to obtain

¹⁸ Wasserstrom, “Global Shanghai,” 206-8.

Western industrial products. This led to an enormous expansion in world production and trade in the mid-19th century. The introduction of iron railways and ships, and the innovation of steam engine and its use in trains, ships and riverboats allowed merchants and producers in coastal, interior and overseas regions to establish faster contacts and trading networks among themselves that led to a boom in the regional and world commercial markets. The construction of railways and quays became major global services provided by the West to the overseas territories and bring about accumulation of enormous wealth in the West. Combined with the developments in the communication and information technology (the invention of telegraph and telephone), instant links were established between the hinterlands, port-cities and Western metropolises resulting in the better organization of production, pricing and international marketing.¹⁹ Besides their geographical and natural assets, the rise of İzmir and Shanghai to transnational centre and global-city status²⁰ was not independent from these semi-material factors.

Semi-material requirements refer to the infrastructural and institutional assets created by man via exploiting the resources of the physical and social environment. In transnational settings, they are expected to provide “high-standard” services and to be recognized by the global system of its time.²¹ Hence, semi-material assets of İzmir and Shanghai were complementary to and as important as their geographical location in shaping their transnational/global-city experiences. For instance, the large-scale commercial transportation networks of navigable waterways (Shanghai) or caravans and railways (İzmir) were important semi-material assets that provided tradesmen easy access between the ports and the hinterlands.

Regarding land transportation, besides caravans, İzmir became the meeting point of regional railway lines in the mid-19th century to meet the requirements of the growing number of foreign merchants. Transportation of commercial goods by the rivers was not possible due to the lack of technical means and capabilities of the time. In order to connect İzmir to the hinterland effectively and increase the volume of trade and profit levels of the merchants the only alternative remaining was the railway construction, and the British government was willing to undertake this enterprise in return for the concessions granted by the Ottoman government. Started in 1857, railway construction connected the surrounding plains and delta regions directly to the coastal and overseas maritime routes centered in İzmir. In addition, construction of modern quays and jetties also contributed to the commercial growth of İzmir. The British and French merchants were in fierce competition for the construction of a new quay in İzmir, and in the end it was granted to the French by the Ottoman government. When the new quay was linked to railway routes via trams, the goods produced and extracted in the hinterland and interior were directly transported to the international markets. The economic feasibility of the transportation systems in İzmir also required a sound communication network. The commercial companies needed well organized telegraph and postal services. Thus, in the second half of the 19th century, a British firm established a telegraph service between İzmir and a number of towns in the hinterland. Eventually all these endeavours contributed to the capitalization

¹⁹ Peter N. Stearns, *Globalization in world history* (London: Routledge, 2010).

²⁰ See *Open Education Sociology Dictionary*, s.v. “global city,” accessed January 30, 2023, <https://sociologydictionary.org/global-city/>; and *Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. “global city,” accessed January 30, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/global-city>.

²¹ Hill, *Foreign Policy*, 171-72.

and liberalization of the city's economy and İzmir was converted into a principal transnational economic centre in the Ottoman Empire.

Shanghai too was located at the commanding position of land, river and maritime transportation systems of the Yangtze River delta region. The opening and modernization of inland waterways, coastal and international transportation systems facilitated and increased the production and the storage of the commercial goods as well as the number of domestic and foreign merchants and companies in the city. Combined with its navigable inland waterways system the railway network construction, which started in the mid-19th and accelerated in the early 20th centuries, further connected Shanghai with the economy of northern and southern regions (mainly the Beijing-Shanghai and the Shanghai-Canton lines) and later western China. Like in İzmir, the development of transportation systems coupled with the construction of modern telecommunication systems in Shanghai. Starting from the 1870s telegraphic and telephone services gradually linked Shanghai to other coastal cities and later to European metropolises. This provided the merchants fast and safe commercial operations in Shanghai.²² These semi-material assets provided the background for Shanghai to become the agriculturally and commercially the most affluent and economically the most advanced transnational port-city of China.

Local Administration

Historically, both İzmir and Shanghai enjoyed relative freedom from direct governmental supervision in conducting their local administrative affairs.²³ This was partly because their geographical distance from the imperial centers and partly the governments did not want to frighten the merchants but encourage coastal and overseas trading activities. Also, the free trade/treaty-port agreements crippled the imperial powers' arbitrary intervention in commercial activities. The administrative offices of İzmir and Shanghai were also not quite like the other Ottoman and Chinese cities. In İzmir, unlike in other cities, the magistrate (*Kadı*) was a highly important administrative figure of the city. The military governor (*Paşa*), and the magistrate administered the city in consultation and coordination.²⁴ Beside his traditional local duties and responsibilities, the *Kadı* of İzmir involved in the conduct of foreign relations as well.²⁵ Furthermore, the Municipal Council of İzmir was created in 1868 and the resident members of all the religious and ethnic communities of İzmir were represented in the municipal and executive councils.²⁶ The city was divided into large Ottoman-Greek, Armenian, Jewish, Muslim and *Frank*

²² Bergère, *Shanghai*, 54.

²³ Reşat Kasaba, "Economic Foundations of a Civil Society: Greeks in the Trade of Western Anatolia, 1840-1876," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1999), 78; Leung Yuen-sang, *The Shanghai Taotai: Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843-90* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990).

²⁴ The authors would like to thank Professor Özer Ergenç for his essential information and suggestion on this point. See also Erkan Serçe, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e İzmir'de Belediye (1868-1945)* (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 1998); and Feryal Tansuğ, "The Greek Community of İzmir/Smyrna in an Age of Transition: The Relationship between Ottoman Centre-Local Governance and the İzmir/Smyrna Greeks, 1840-1866," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 1 (2011): 55, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2011.559002>.

²⁵ Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, İzmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 85.

²⁶ Reşat Kasaba, "İzmir 1922: A Port City Unravels," in *Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean*, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 211.

(Levantines and Europeans) quarters. Although these communities did not have their autonomous municipal administrations, they were allowed to develop their own communal constitutions and administer their institutions by autonomous councils.²⁷ Correspondingly, Shanghai was formally governed by a circuit intendant called “Treaty-port Taotai” whose administrative functions, besides, “ordinary taotai” functions (of justice, finance, education and military affairs), involved the conduct of Shanghai’s daily foreign affairs, managing customs duties and negotiating agreements with the consuls.²⁸ In terms of municipal affairs there was tripartite municipal zones in Shanghai: The International Settlement of British and American Concessions, French Concession and the Chinese City. The concessions area (especially the Bund and Nanjing Road) was the heart of Shanghai’s business and urban life that made Shanghai a world metropolis.²⁹ This was quite similar to the İzmir’s *Frank* quarter (Frank Street, Kordon and Puntto) where the commercial and urban life of İzmir was concentrated. The Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and its Executive Council, created in the International Settlement mainly by the foreign merchants in 1854, were highly powerful and autonomous administrative bodies managing the port-city’s affairs except in judicial matters.³⁰ Although they were in majority in the international settlement the Chinese were not represented in the executive bodies of SMC until 1927.

The weak administrative ties with the imperial centres and relative administrative freedom in local affairs brought into play a limited form of *democracy* in both İzmir and Shanghai. And by providing merchants and entrepreneurs easy access to wealthy regions in a relatively *laissez-faire* environment both cities became the enticing sites for natives and foreigners to seek their fortunes and fulfil their dreams in thriving economies. Eventually it was not surprising that both cities were reputed to be the *liberal places* of their times in the dissolving empires of East and West Asia.³¹

Demographic and Cultural Attributes

İzmir and Shanghai were particular places in terms of their demographic and cultural compositions. The distinctive demographic profile of both cities composed of a mix of ethnic, religious and overseas communities from inside and around the world. They were pluricultural cities ascending on the old and new civilizational contexts simultaneously. In fact, İzmir was the city of emigrants. The influx of people from the hinterland and other provinces of the Empire was due to various economic or political reasons.³² There were Ottoman-Muslim, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Levantine, and Hellenic-Greek, British, French, Russian, Italian, Austrian, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and American communities in İzmir.³³ Thus it was usual to hear several languages spoken with different dialects in and around the harbour and commercial center: from English to Italian and French to Arabic, Greek, Ladino and Russian, etc.³⁴ The demographic

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Leung, *Shanghai Taotai*, 72-79.

²⁹ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 2.

³⁰ Ibid., 111-19.

³¹ Niv Horesh, *Shanghai, past and present: a concise socio-economic history, 1842-2012* (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 8; Kasaba, “Civil Society,” 78.

³² Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 98.

³³ Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 85.

³⁴ Rauf Beyru, *19. Yüzyılda İzmir’de Yaşam* (İstanbul: Literatür, 2000), 142.

and ethno-cultural composition of Shanghai was no different from İzmir.³⁵ There were a vast number of emigrant Chinese from other provinces whose own dialects were unintelligible by and rituals different from the local and other emigrant groups. Other than overseas Chinese, there were British subjects including Indians, Parsees, Ismailis, Sephardic Jews; French subjects included Indo-Chinese; Americans included Filipinos; and also, there were Japanese, Germans, Russians and Portuguese. Several languages and dialects were spoken in the commercial centre of Shanghai too. Moreover, all the main religious orders were represented in İzmir and Shanghai. They were at the intersections of the great civilizations: İzmir, being at the crossroads of Islam, Christianity, Judaism and modernity; Shanghai as a meeting point for Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity and modernity, served to unite these vast civilizations and developed into distinctive hybrid cultural settings.

It was not just these material and semi-material assets that created such distinctive port-cities. It was when all these characteristics were accompanied with unprecedented externalisation and commercialization, İzmir and Shanghai were transformed into *fresh* transnational entities. The peculiar combination of local politico-cultural administration with a new socio-economic organization led to a specific mode of wealth and power generation and distribution. Accordingly, in the second half of the 19th century both cities became prominent trading and cultural centers and world metropolises.³⁶ They were cosmopolitan cities already, but now with the advent of “free trade imperialism” they were transformed into *transnational macrocosms*. In the next part, we focus on the process of how İzmir and Shanghai became transnational macrocosms in the context of shifting interaction patterns of both the state and non-state actors and of the local and foreign non-state actors at different historical moments of transnationalism, not only in the political and economic sense but also through various forms of social and cultural engagements.

Transnational Dimension

As an actor-generated phenomena “transnational relations” is a significant aspect of global-city experience of İzmir and Shanghai in comparative history perspective. İzmir and Shanghai were “liberal” and “free trade” cities where local and foreign autonomous non-state groups existed and formed up into a “civil society”, successfully interacting with each other and the state on a transnational basis. Wealth was the source of their power. Whether these human agencies are addressed as “intermediaries” or “middlemen”, or “compradors” or “capitalists”, or “bourgeoisie”, or “cosmopolitans” with respect to their civic, social, economic or public status³⁷ it seems that “transnational actors” provides an alternative and embracing concept to define their social standings.

³⁵ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 84-87.

³⁶ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 4; Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 128-33.

³⁷ See Reşat Kasaba, “Was There a Compradore Bourgeoisie in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Western Anatolia?” *Review* 11, no. 2 (Spring 1988), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241093>; Bergère, *Shanghai*; Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*; Athanasios Gekas, “Compradors to Cosmopolitans? The Historiographical Fortunes of Merchants in Eastern Mediterranean Ports” (Working Paper, European University Institute, Fiesole, IT, 2008); and Haris Exertzoglou, “The Development of a Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie: Investment Patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1914,” in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1999).

The 19th century penetration of transnationalism into the Ottoman and Chinese empires was a result of the victory of the *laissez-faire* liberalism over the chartered monopoly capitalism. Nevertheless, private merchants still had to rely on the state to exist and protect their economic and security interests abroad. For instance, just before the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Free Trade Agreement, a number of letters and reports communicated between European merchants and their embassies/consulates revealed the merchants' pressures over their states to take effective measures against the official and arbitrary trade restrictions, and demanding the abrogation of domestic monopolies in the Empire.³⁸ Similarly, in 1833 British merchants demanded from their government to put pressure on the Chinese Empire to abolish the restrictions on opium trade and the suppression of Chinese guild monopolies.³⁹ The private merchants were not able to deal effectively with the Ottoman and Chinese states on their own and relied on the diplomatic and military power of their states to penetrate into the Ottoman and Chinese markets. In return the Western powers aimed at political gain and economic mastery *vis-a-vis* their rivals over the Levant and East Asia respectively. Thus, in the Ottoman and Chinese empires the 19th century reforms and transformations that followed wars and/or treaties served successfully to accommodate foreign non-state actors and enable them to conduct transnational activities. The weakened posture of imperial states facilitated the penetration of foreign non-state actors into the imperial lands. They acquired property rights, land ownership, judicial and administrative privileges, right to travel freely, and security to their lives, properties and activities. However, their physical access did not mean ready penetration into civil society and to dominate local non-state actors. Alignment and establishing transnational coalitions with local actors in İzmir and Shanghai were shaped and reshaped by the clashing interests of foreign and local private actors and by the international developments.

Until the arrival of the free trade order, İzmir was more of a significant commercial junction for transit goods from and to Asia and Europe, but starting from the 1840s the port was developed into a major export center for mainly the goods produced and extracted in the hinterland. A major effect of this change was the creation of a significant amount of wealth. This wealth, accumulated by the private actors, remained in the region and converted into an independent source of power for asserting autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman government.⁴⁰ The organization and management of production and commerce were now increasingly regulated and governed by the private interests and channels. The administrative reforms coupled with the restructuring in the organization of economic activities placed limits on the controlling power of the government and the state recognized tacitly the autonomy of the non-state domain, which consequently brought about a major transformation in the hierarchy of existing social groups in İzmir. The network of the private actors was composed of small peasant-producers, private tax-farmers, caravan traders, merchants, money-lenders, agents and brokers of wholesalers, and export firms. However, it was mainly the tax-farmers, merchants, money lenders and money changers who formed the core elements of this local non-state network.⁴¹ On the other,

³⁸ Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 85-96.

³⁹ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007), 340; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 16-17.

⁴⁰ Reşat Kasaba, "A time and a place for the nonstate: social change in the Ottoman Empire during the 'long nineteenth century,'" in *State Power and Social Forces*, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 211-12.

⁴¹ Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 60.

foreign non-state actors, in touch with their consulates and the Ottoman authorities, interacted with and entered into transactions with these local private actors, and they altogether set in motion the transnational network in İzmir. The expansion of economic activities resulted in the increasing interaction between various foreign and local private actors and also between them and the state actors. Consequently, for the first time the local merchants were fully incorporated in the international commercial markets while the foreign merchants actively engaged in business with the local private actors in and around İzmir.⁴²

Shanghai, too, was a major regional commercial and trading port before the advent of the *laissez-faire* order. After the treaty-port agreement in 1843 the rapid increase in the volume of trade and financial services turned Shanghai into the most important commercial and financial hub of China. Comparable to İzmir's experience, the Yangtze delta peasants now began to produce largely for the world markets⁴³ and the merchants were integrated with the international business circles. The rapid economic growth resulted in the generation of a large amount of wealth, and the prime mover of this growth was the private enterprise organized in a network of merchants (and their associations), itinerant traders, bankers, exporters, manufacturers, wholesalers, shopkeepers, artisans and shipbuilders.⁴⁴ The merchants' associations together with the professional guilds managed the economic transactions and organized the local and interregional economy. Again, like their *İzmiriot* counterparts the Shanghainese merchants enjoyed relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state based on wealth and organization. The foreign non-state actors, mainly the merchants, bankers and investors, and their local counterparts constituted the Shanghai's transnational network in a process of conflict and cooperation and in contact with their consulates and the Chinese administrators.

The State and Transnationalism

The state was a decisive factor in maintaining transnationalism in İzmir and Shanghai. In İzmir all foreign merchants acquired extra-territoriality and the political protection of the consuls. Besides, granting or selling foreign passports to the local merchants doing business with the European merchants by the consuls was a common practice that provided security to their commercial activities. Thus, many Ottoman-Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants and financiers acquired the nationality and protection of the foreign powers.⁴⁵ On the other, the interventions of the foreign consuls in the Ottoman bureaucracy on behalf of the merchants became a routine activity.⁴⁶ For instance, expanding the limits of extra-territoriality, dealing with the various obstacles fomented by local competitors, establishing commercial banks, etc., the foreign merchants asked for the leverage, assistance and protection of their diplomatic representatives in İzmir. Moreover, the gunboats were anchored in the harbour for the security of foreigners in the last resort.⁴⁷ The British merchants also received the backing of the Ottoman government in their attempt to establish their own marketing networks in western Anatolia.⁴⁸

42 Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "Western and Local Entrepreneurs in Izmir in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in "Son Yüzyıllarda İzmir ve Batı Anadolu" Uluslararası Sempozyumu (İzmir: Ege Üniversitesi, 1992), 81.

43 Hoeshe, *Shanghai*, 5.

44 Bergère, *Shanghai*, 25-26.

45 Frangakis-Syrett, "Local Entrepreneurs," 80.

46 Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 71.

47 Beyru, *İzmir'de Yaşam*, 69.

48 Kasaba, "Compradore Bourgeoisie," 219.

Moreover, the consuls themselves asked the service of powerful local notables for providing security to foreign merchants.⁴⁹ At times, even the Ottoman merchants asked the support of the consuls in their disputes with the Ottoman officials.⁵⁰

In Shanghai too the consuls extended extra-territoriality rights and political protection to both foreign and local merchants. The Chinese state, on the other hand, delegated the imperial authority to the Taotai to administer Shanghai together with the consuls. Thus, the establishment of successful transnational relations were built upon somewhat harmonious relations between foreign and local state authorities who negotiated agreements and compromises between themselves.⁵¹ The consuls felt themselves free to intervene with the Chinese authorities. Thus, foreign non-states actors in their relations with the imperial state usually asked the intervention or intermediation of their respective consuls to promote their interests. However, the economic interests of the foreign merchants did not always overlap with the political interests of their respective governments. Such discords between their state representatives and non-state actors also shaped the structure of the transnational domain in Shanghai. For instance, the merchants' attempt not to pay maritime custom duties to Chinese after the Small Swords Rebellion, which destroyed the imperial authority over the customs office, opposed by the British Consul. The consul, in cooperation with Taotai, drawn a new legal framework, brought the customs office under foreign control and re-established Shanghai a free and no longer a non-authoritative commercial port.⁵² On the other, the Chinese state was not able to support Chinese merchants but even exploited them.⁵³ The power of the foreign non-state actors was based on wealth, but also on the consuls and ultimately, like in İzmir, on the gunboats anchored in Shanghai harbour.

The Nature of Early Transnational Contacts between Non-State Actors

Despite the treaty and reform-bound socioeconomic liberalization had the support and cooperation of the state actors the European merchants encountered major difficulties in İzmir in penetrating into the local markets and displacing the local actors. The physical access of foreign merchants did not necessarily lead to effective control of the local structures. They confronted a strong resistance from the local non-state actors. The objectives and interests of foreign and local non-state actors and local administrators stood in opposition to one another. Initially, the foreign powers, merchants and investors keenly supported the establishment of a well-organized and orderly administered Ottoman economy, sought to invest in agriculture and finance, and establish their own branches in the interiors of İzmir without using local intermediaries.⁵⁴ Therefore they attempted to establish large scale farms in the hinterland and founded commercial banks in İzmir to put an end to the financial and exchange rate anarchy.⁵⁵ However such ventures proved unsuccessful: Foreigners were not able to avoid and circumvent the league and network of local tax-farmers, merchants, money lenders and money changers who

⁴⁹ Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 122.

⁵⁰ Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 71.

⁵¹ Horesh, *Shanghai*, 48.

⁵² Bergère, *Shanghai*, 47-48.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁴ Kasaba, "Compradore Bourgeoisie," 220-22.

⁵⁵ The Commercial Bank of Smyrna established by the British Government; however, the British merchants established the Smyrna Bank under the protection of the Swedish Embassy.

had linguistic advantage, local contacts, comprehensive and private knowledge of the market and understanding of production, customs and tastes even in the remote corners of the interior. Besides, the local actors effectively controlled the monetary networks through extending credit both to the peasants, private business and even the administrators, and they became the money-changers in an anarchic monetary environment where there was no formal banking institutions. The local actors effectively prevented the foreigners' attempt to undermine their control over the region's agricultural production, trade and finance. They were the only actors who successfully established contacts with the peasant producers, Ottoman government and foreigners simultaneously.⁵⁶ Eventually, the foreigners proved to be unsuccessful in competing with these networks in the hinterland. Without any legal base the local non-state actors instituted and enforced various sur-taxes, requirements and monopolies, and deterred the indebted peasant producers from entering into business with the foreigners.⁵⁷ Eventually, the foreign merchants established themselves in İzmir and the coastal towns only and had to concede to the existing market structures and rely on the local actors for their business dealings in the hinterland.

The transnational contacts of these groups in the early stages can be characterized as more rivalry and less cooperation: European merchants were supported by their consuls and the Ottoman government while the local merchants, brokers, money-lenders/changers were collaborating with each other and worked with the weakened provincial administrators who were not happy with the new market order.⁵⁸ To reconcile with their local counterparts foreign non-state actors realized that they had to adjust their policies with the local interests. This alignment reshaped the character of transnational interactions in İzmir in the next stage. Foreign merchants who were not able to establish control over the organization and functioning of local networks, appointed local non-Muslim merchants as their agents, sub-agents, brokers, representatives or directors in import and export trade. The locals became indispensable actors linking the production sites in the hinterland to the regional markets and to İzmir and buying and selling for foreign commercial houses.⁵⁹ Thus, a division of labour was established: While the local actors organized business operations in the hinterland, the foreign commercial houses effectively controlled the purchasing, supervising and shipping processes in İzmir, and possessed sources of capital, technology and new managerial methods.⁶⁰

In Shanghai, too, although cordial relations developed between the foreign and imperial authorities the foreign merchants and investors were not able to penetrate effectively into the interior.⁶¹ Like their counterparts in İzmir, the foreigners in Shanghai were confronted with strong resistance from the local non-state market actors and were not allowed to establish themselves in the interior, but had to accept the conditions of local merchants and financiers for doing

⁵⁶ Kasaba, "Compradore Bourgeoisie," 217.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 221.

⁵⁸ Kasaba, "Compradore Bourgeoisie," 224; Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "The Economic Activities of the Greek Community of İzmir in the Second Half of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1999), 20-23.

⁵⁹ Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 212.

⁶⁰ Frangakis-Syrett, "Local Entrepreneurs," 82, 88.

⁶¹ Arrighi, *Adam Smith*, 336; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 4-5.

business. There was a gap between the treaties and their implementation. They were not able to get around the monopolistic local structures until the end of the 19th century. The local actors protected their domain, even by using violence, and prevented the foreign merchants buying products directly from the peasant producers.⁶² Foreigners relied on local non-states for both purchasing local products and marketing their goods. The Chinese non-state actor networks were strictly controlling the local markets and internal trading through their cohesive, geographical, professional and family organizations and their familiarity with the local culture, tastes, and their command of spoken languages.⁶³ Thus, likewise in İzmir, there was a division of labour: while the local non-state networks organized and controlled all the economic activities between the interior and Shanghai, the commercial relations and trading networks between Shanghai and the overseas markets were dominated by the foreign merchants.

The competition between the foreign and domestic non-state actors in Shanghai produced not only conflict but cooperation as well. The cooperation of the local actors was achieved by recruiting the competent and qualified Chinese from the merchant associations and the bureaucracy in return for granting them, via their consulates, the (extra-territorial) privileges that they themselves enjoyed. The instruments for cooperation included reciprocal investments, borrowed identities and false foreign company names.⁶⁴ The cooperation in the economic domain was chiefly sustained by a pragmatic non-state community called compradors. Being the *crème de la crème* of the relatively autonomous local merchant-banker community of Shanghai, the compradors can be comparable with the İzmir's non-Muslim, intermediary Greek-Ottoman merchants, money-lenders and changers. They were the key actors between the state, local and foreign communities.⁶⁵ Thus similar to their counterparts in İzmir they became the indispensable partners of foreign merchants as intermediaries, brokers, guarantors for the financial obligations of local partners, or permanent employees in their commercial houses.⁶⁶ They were the key assistants of the foreigners for overcoming the difficulties of the complex monetary system, eliminating the cultural and linguistic barriers, and doing business with the local actors. They became the bridge between Shanghai and the West. Similar to the İzmir's non-Muslim entrepreneurs, the compradors, the well-off businessmen, enjoyed extra-territoriality and escaped from restrictions and pressures of the Chinese bureaucracy, also run their commercial and brokering activities independently. In comparison, both Shanghai and İzmir owed their rise to their strong links with domestic and overseas markets, thus to the activities of foreign and local transnational actors.

⁶² Bergère, *Shanghai*, 69-70; Kaori Abe, "Intermediary Elites in the Treaty Port World: Tong Mow-chee and His Collaborators in Shanghai, 1873-1897," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 25, no. 3 (July 2015): 469-70, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186315000139>.

⁶³ Abe, "Intermediary Elites," 466-67.

⁶⁴ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 77.

⁶⁵ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "Cosmopolitan Connections and Transnational Networks," in *At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-building in Republican Shanghai*, ed. Nara Dillon and Jean C. Oi (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 221; Kasaba, "Nonstate," 213.

⁶⁶ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 71-74; Abe, "Intermediary Elites," 465.

Transnationalism and Changes in Social Hierarchy

The international treaties and series of reform edicts that bring about a “free trade” and “liberal” order in İzmir significantly restructured the social hierarchy by strengthening the formerly weak religio-ethnic groups and created new autonomous seats of power based on wealth and organizational power. In this process the non-Muslim economic elites increased their power and influence over the Ottoman state, and upgraded their standing in the social hierarchy mostly at the expense of the Muslim elites.⁶⁷ The power of the Muslim merchants, local bureaucrats and notables which largely derived from the power and the authority of the Ottoman state was undermined with the incorporation of the Empire into the *lassiez-faire* market economy and the establishment of transnational interactions. The Muslim elite who was not familiar with the changing conditions of the economic structure and deprived of the protection of the state relegated into a secondary position. On the other hand, non-Muslim tax-farmers, merchants and money-lenders who were well acquainted with the new business environment and now acquired favourable social and legal rights highly benefited from this new setting, and elevated themselves to a privileged position in the social hierarchy. Being able to acquire European passports they used their Ottoman and European identities interchangeably depending on their own interests. With the political protection coming from the European governments the long-established balance between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities was disrupted at the expense of the former and the latter became autonomus from the Ottoman government. And due to their control over the regional markets they established their autonomy *vis-a-vis* the foreigners either and engaged in transnational interactions in the *lassiez faire* environment. The declining Ottoman state was not able to halt this process.

The change also elevated the Ottoman-Greeks to the most prominent status in the social hierarchy of non-Muslim groups in İzmir. They owed their prominence mainly to their controlling power over trade. Their successful commercial organization based on close kinship ties linked Greek commercial houses together in the Empire and around the world. In the mid-19th century, they became internationally known shipping, trading, merchant and financial families in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, Europe, and even in India, and the main agents of European commercial houses.⁶⁸ The Western capital found its way through their mainly local Ottoman-Greek contacts in İzmir. Like the overseas Chinese, the domestic and international kinship networks provided the Greeks of İzmir a unique advantage and autonomy over all competitors in accessing minute, sole and confidential knowledge about domestic and international markets. More than the Ottoman-Armenians, Jews and the Levantines the Ottoman-Greeks dominated the non-state and thus transnational terrain of İzmir.⁶⁹

In Shanghai, too, the increasing wealth of the new entrepreneur community (compradors/middlemen) had the effect of transforming the economic and social standings of the traditional groups. The traditional guild merchants were highly disturbed by the autonomous rise of this privileged Shanghainese entrepreneurs who enjoyed extra-territoriality status and escaped tax levies of the state. Thanks to the existence of different jurisdictions in Shanghai they shifted from one identity to another depending on their private interests. Under the protection of

⁶⁷ Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 58, 102; Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 122.

⁶⁸ Frangakis-Syrett, “Greek Community,” 19; Kasaba, “Nonstate,” 213.

⁶⁹ Kasaba, “Nonstate,” 213.

the foreign consuls, they acquired further commercial and legal advantages and guarantees for their long-term investments in foreign companies. Although the traditional elite asked the intervention of the imperial bureaucrats against these assertive entrepreneurs the declining imperial authority did remain ineffectual before the Sino-foreign transnational collaboration. Traditionally, the Confucian scholars and landowners (gentry) and their value systems were at the top of the social hierarchy and the merchants were at the bottom. However, this hierarchy was gradually transformed in favour of the wealthier new merchants and their value systems (modernism and pragmatism) starting from the mid-19th century.⁷⁰ And when the wealth became more important than the traditional virtues, the gentry tended to join the ranks of the new merchants to maintain their social distinction. However, unlike in İzmir, the economic power of the compradors was not converted properly into political power.⁷¹ The merchant communities occasionally became formidable lobbies compelling the imperial authority to be tolerant and flexible. This gap between economic, social and political power produced a complex structure of relations between the imperial officials and the Chinese merchants but usually they sought cooperation with each other. On the other hand, the foreign merchants, who were in difficulty to understand this complex interaction aligned more with the Chinese merchants but also sought the support of the imperial bureaucracy.

Analogous to *İzmiriot* Greeks, for centuries Chinese tradesmen had emigrated overseas and established the global Chinese overseas community. However they retained their family and kinship connections by travelling and trading between overseas and Shanghai and other treaty-ports, and even resettling and investing in Shanghai.⁷² Now, in the 19th century they provided the Shanghainese compradors international business networks from Southeast Asia, Japan and Australia to elsewhere in the British Empire and America.⁷³ In fact, overseas Chinese compradors from Shanghai (and other treaty-ports) constituted the true native transnational elite linking global to the local and retaining their middleman/comprador selfhood alongside their overseas identity. The Ottoman-Greek diaspora spread across Europe and the Mediterranean was the Empire's transnational elite but not as indigenous as their Chinese counterparts. Rather, they mostly carried out their business in İzmir through their kinship connections as "absentee middlemen".

Certainly, transnationalism transformed the fabric of societies, but on the other hand, external developments remolded the nature of transnationalism in the later stages of the 19th century and beyond.

⁷⁰ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 104-7.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷² For the story of overseas and Chinese comprador Tong Mow-chee, see Abe, "Intermediary Elites."

⁷³ Kaori Abe, "The City of Intermediaries: Compradors in Hong Kong from the 1830 to the 1880s" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Bristol, 2014), 129-56; Abe, "Intermediary Elites," 470.

External Developments and the Changing Facets of Transnationalism in İzmir and Shanghai

Starting from the 1860s, transnational interactions gained new characters in İzmir and Shanghai. The exceptional increase in the volume of export trade and higher profits caused by the American Civil War urged the local non-state actors to invest further in export oriented (agricultural) production and foreign trade and cooperate more with foreign merchants for marketing opportunities.⁷⁴ In İzmir the Ottoman non-Muslims were further incorporated into the international markets. The Ottoman-Greek (and Armenian) entrepreneurs took advantage of and improved their international trading kinship connections and networks and even owned trading companies in Europe. The Greek firms in Britain even exported cloth to İzmir through British agents representing them in the city. In Shanghai, Yangtze River hinterland was opened for the commercial activities of the foreign merchants, and Chinese merchants' and firms' contacts with the international markets were boosted. Moreover, the rapid increase in external trade also intensified the volume of financial activities and demand for credit, insurance and money-changing operations. The external businesses were monopolized by the big foreign trading companies and foreign banks. However, the comprador-bankers who organized the financial dealings of the foreign commercial houses and banks in the domestic markets created new external business and marketing opportunities to the Chinese producers and merchants.

The external developments in the following decades of the 19th century brought about profound changes in the transnational domains of İzmir and Shanghai. The end of the American Civil War and the following world economic depression (1873-1896) slowed down the production and trading activities. In İzmir, international markets for agricultural products stagnated and commercial activity lost its previous dynamism.⁷⁵ The local non-state actors who invested in export trade were hit hard by the international economic downturn. Foreign trade was no longer a profitable business. Another significant development was the establishment of the Public Debt Administration (PDA) in 1881 by the foreigners for the fiscal management of the bankrupted Ottoman public finances. The PDA was a supranational organization representing the interests of the major European states and transnational capital. During the wars against the Russians the Ottoman state had become highly indebted to foreign lenders. The European Powers were sensitive over the political survival of the Empire both for their strategic calculations and safeguarding and refunding of the investments of their citizens. Accordingly, transnational actors, via the PDA, relied on states for the security and promotion of their investments and interests *vis-a-vis* rival non-state or state actors in the Empire. The creation of PDA put an end to the long-lasting monetary and exchange-rate anarchy in the empire, increased tax revenues, and established fiscal stability. However, the local non-state actors were again hit hard for they were almost cut off from their traditional monopoly of money-lending and exchange activities. In this way while the visibility of the Ottoman state reinstated the local non-state groups, and their networks were gradually displaced from commanding positions over the economic activities; and the flow of foreign capital into western Anatolia was accelerated. The inflow of large amounts of Western private capital in the region led to the establishment of relatively modern industry. The displaced local non-state actors now attempted to capitalize

⁷⁴ Frangakis-Syrett, "Greek Community," 20-21; Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 100; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 50-56.

⁷⁵ Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 110-12.

on new opportunities and involved into the light industrial, mining and service sector activities often as the junior partner or as agents of the foreign non-state actors.⁷⁶ Together they established a new form of transnational interaction that can be described as “Ottoman foreign capitalism”. The local non-state actors, mainly the Ottoman-Greeks, participated in the joint-stock companies in the light industrial sectors, mining, shipping, insurance, banking and finance. However, even in few sectors where they were dominant (i.e., soap and wine) they were not able to compete with the imported goods. Moreover, the foreign capital and technology totally dominated the infrastructural investments of railways, quays, roads, electricity, telephones and irrigation in İzmir and the hinterland. Collaboration with the Ottoman government via the PDA brought the victory of foreign non-state actors over their local non-Muslim counterparts and significantly changed the power relations in the transnational domain of İzmir. As a result of this cooperation between the states and the non-state actors, the foreign powers advanced their geopolitical interests in the Near East.

Similar to İzmir, the global developments resulted in changes in power relations in the transnational domain of Shanghai. When the global trade slowed down and the export of traditional production-goods declined the Chinese realized the need to modernize the economic system and invest in industrial development.⁷⁷ Starting from the 1870s, merchant-compradors invested in industrial business, but the modern investments remained overwhelmingly foreign-owned. Between 1870-1914 local capital investments in light industrial sectors for domestic consumption were not able to compete with the imported goods and foreign companies that enjoyed technological and managerial superiority. The traditional local non-state actors lost their controlling power over the economy with the industrial modernization process. However, collaboration between the compradors and the foreign transnational actors increased further. After the defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, when the foreigners were legally allowed to invest in industrial sectors in Shanghai, the compradors invested large amounts in foreign joint-stock companies in the fields of naval repair yards, mechanical silk and cotton mill industries.⁷⁸ Besides, public utility services such as waterworks, gas lightening and later electricity networks and construction of urban roads and tramways were foreign private investments, but unlike in İzmir, the shareholders were wealthy comprador-bankers and entrepreneurs who did not hesitate to invest in long-term projects. The Chinese non-state actors and the imperial bureaucrats in Shanghai were behind this rapid “Sino-foreign” industrial development.

The external and domestic developments resulted in the establishment of a foreign financial control over the revenues of the Chinese government too. This change intensified the relations between the states and the foreign non-state actors and consolidated the superiority of the foreign non-state actors over their local counterparts. The two important supranational institutions, *The Maritime Customs Administration* (MCA) and *The Four-Power Consortium*, reshaped the course of transnational relations in Shanghai. These supranational institutions were based both on cooperation, collaboration, and rivalry among foreign private bankers and the states.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Exertzoglou, “Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie,” 90-103; Frangakis-Syrett, “Greek Community,” 25-33.

⁷⁷ Wolfgang Keller, Ben Li, and Carol H. Shiu, “Shanghai’s Trade, China’s Growth: Continuity, Recovery, and Change since the Opium War” (Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, January 2012), 55; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 78-79.

⁷⁸ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 58-65.

⁷⁹ Feis, *Europe*, 430-62; Robert Bickers, ed., *The Chinese Maritime Customs: An International Service, 1854-1950*,

The financial and commercial markets of Shanghai, dominated by Britain until the 1890s, began to be rivalled by the German, French, Belgian, American, Japanese, and Russian private and/or state actors. The MCA was founded by the foreign consuls after the Small Swords Rebellion in 1854 in Shanghai for the efficient collection of customs revenues (similar to the High Council of the Treasury established in the Ottoman Empire in 1858 which was converted into PDA in 1881). Comparable to the Ottoman experience before the Crimean War, until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 the Chinese government had no debts to the foreigners. During the war China received loans from the British HSBC Bank. Yet the war-time Bank loans and the indemnities imposed on China after the war-defeat and the suppression of anti-foreign Boxer Uprising that followed, were all secured on the customs revenues. Consequently, the MCA was converted into a collecting agent in the service of foreign creditors, supervising customs and internal revenue collection. Now under the strict control of foreign governments the MCA, similar to the PDA in the Ottoman Empire, served to regular interest payments for foreign bondholders and increased the creditworthiness of the Chinese government. The revenues collected by the MCA were also diverted to the service of foreign creditors' loans for industrial and public utility investment in the early 20th century. The Consortium, on the other hand, was a private institution composed of major powerful foreign banking groups in direct connections with national governments, extending loans to central and local Chinese authorities. The Consortium banks were keen on protecting the capital of their investors. Thus, support of the governments was vitally important in averting the risks generated by the vacillations of Chinese authorities and competing rival foreign and local investors. Protecting the interests and investments of businessmen and bankers provided the foreign governments important means and grounds to promote their own geopolitical interests and political control in Shanghai, China, and in the Far East.

Twentieth Century Global Challenges and the Decline of Transnationalism

The twentieth century was another era of large-scale historical change that fundamentally transformed the transnational domains in İzmir and Shanghai. The 19th century *laissez-faire* liberalism and interest in “peaceful business” had elevated transnationalism at its culminating point; however, nationalism, protectionism, war and statism in the early 20th century started the process of the disappearance of the transnational landscape of the port-cities. And after the World War II, for different reasons, neither İzmir nor Shanghai were able to rebuild their one-time transnational macrocosms.

In the early 20th century Ottoman and Chinese imperial dynasties were overthrown by the republican-nationalist revolutions. The liberal-nationalist ideas were mainly introduced via the transnational relations and the modernization process, and resulted in the Chinese, Greek and, as a response to that, Turkish nationalisms. Both the 1911 (Chinese) and 1923 (Turkish) republican revolutions aimed at getting rid of the foreign imperialists and their native imperial accomplices. The Turkish Republic was founded sometime after the military defeats in the Balkan Wars (1912) and the World War I (1918), and the Chinese Republic sometime after the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1895). In this context, although the unfolding of events, stages of change, and timing suggest different factual stories for İzmir and Shanghai the responses of the political and social forces and outcomes reveals striking comparisons in global history and transnational phenomena.

İzmir was occupied (1919-1922) by the Hellenic-Greek and Shanghai was attacked (1932) and invaded (1937) by the Japanese armed forces that resulted in wars, tragedies and long-lasting problems between Turkey and Greece, or China and Japan. The policy of geographical expansion pursued by Greece and Japan in the 1920s and 1930-1940s respectively shaped the destiny of İzmir and Shanghai and their transnational macrocosms. The Ottoman and Hellenic-Greek elite were taken with the Hellenic nationalism but the Hellenic occupation of İzmir brought about the end of the prospered Ottoman-Greek (also the other non-Muslim and foreign) socio-economic elite of İzmir in a few years time. In 1922 when the Turkish national forces entered into the city, the transnational macrocosm of İzmir was almost terminated. In Shanghai, although the intensity of transnational interactions once again revived at the end of the World War I, the Japanese annexation of Manchuria (1931) and attack on Shanghai (1932), and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, followed by the invasion of Shanghai and East China similarly put an end to the existence of prospered Shanghainese and foreign non-state actors, and thus the transnational macrocosm of Shanghai.

19th century transnationalism brought about the loss of wealth and status of the traditional economic and political elites of İzmir and Shanghai and created resentment against the foreign and local transnational actors. The resentment that reached its apogee after the military defeats in wars and the occupation of İzmir and Shanghai by the foreign armies, gave rise to counter-nationalist movements and resulted in anti-foreign uprisings (Chinese Boxer Rebellion), wars and the relocation of ethno-religious minorities (during the World War I and after the Turkish War of Independence) in the early 20th century. This, in turn resulted in the loss of the wealth and prosperity accumulated via transnational interactions since the mid-19th century. The liberal, modern and transnational characteristics of İzmir and Shanghai and their resemblance to Western cities paved the path to their rise as well as their decline.

After the establishment of the Republics, Shanghai and, to a lesser extent, İzmir were somewhat able to retain their liberal traditions for some time in line with the trends in the world economy.⁸⁰ While the transnational actors and their vibrant social life existed in Shanghai until the 1937 Sino-Japanese War, in İzmir transnational actors almost disappeared from the stage and the city lost its cheerful nature in the late 1920s. The global trend towards nationalism and protectionism after the Great Depression were the main obstacles against the survival of the “revived” transnational macrocosm in Shanghai, let alone in İzmir. Correspondingly, both republics largely established their customs autonomy, and the regimes of concessions (China) or capitulations (Turkey) were either limited or eliminated. The republican governments pursued the policy of integration of national markets and started campaigns for the consumption of native products while the private initiative and *laissez faire* liberalism was discredited. Modernization was now accepted in terms of national power: The initiatives for modernization and development now came from the state actors. In one way or another when the state of “limited-democracy” and “free-trade” vanished away from İzmir and Shanghai after the 1920s, the transnational attributes and its human agency ceased to exist too. In the 1940s and the post-World War II period İzmir and Shanghai were marginalized by the conservative-nationalist and communist political authorities respectively who never forgot the cities’ transnational-

80 Alp Yücel Kaya, “Sondeyiş: ‘Şehir Senin Peşini Bırakmayacak,’” in *İzmir 1830-1930 Unutulmuş Bir Kent mi? Bir Osmanlı Limanından Hatıralar*, ed. Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), 259; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 147-76.

cosmopolitan and pluri-ethnic, multi-religious past. And their subsequent economic, cultural and intellectual separation from the external world brought about the loss of their transnational port-city characteristics thereafter.⁸¹

Yet, the impact of the 19th century transnationalism was not all about economy and politics. Transnationalism went hand in hand with cultural transformation in İzmir and Shanghai. It brought in its' baggage novel values and behavioural patterns that granted them the global-city status and reshaped the daily social life of the people as well. And even after transnationalism ceased to exist in İzmir and Shanghai its' residual attributes still shape the daily life of their inhabitants. The next section will focus on the similar cultural impact of transnationalism on the social life and global-city experiences of İzmir and Shanghai during and after the 19th century.

Social and Cultural Facets of Transnationalism

Transnationalism was a decisive factor in the liberal-modernization process of İzmir and Shanghai. It brought scientific, professional and social awareness and the betterment of public services in both cities. As the agents of modernization, both local and foreign non-state actors broadened the scope of their activities and invested in education (modern schools), health (hospitals), security (police force and firemen); building infrastructure, street cleaning, and public lightening and transportation. However, modernization process resulted in the modern/conservative dichotomy and differences in the philosophical/ideological constructions among the merchants, guildsmen and in the society in both cities. Those who were rich and involved in foreign trade divorced themselves from the ecclesiastical authority of the Church or Confucianism while the merchants or scholar-merchants involved in local trade remained loyal to their spiritual institutions.⁸² Nevertheless there was not a total break with tradition in the modernizing group and under the pressure of *zeitgeist* traditional groups too adopted modernizing policies to varying degrees.

In İzmir and Shanghai, the role played by the wealthy Ottoman non-Muslims and compradors in advancing the modern, transnational character of their respective cities was much more than facilitating the economic transactions. Their capacity and ability to cross social, cultural, national, political and economic boundaries and networks created an urban culture that distinguished both cities from the predominantly rural Ottoman and Chinese towns.⁸³ During a century-long period, transnational interactions of all kinds reached their peak in İzmir and Shanghai.⁸⁴ The new economic order also introduced challenges to the established cultural norms and institutional arrangements and created a new mercantile culture. For businessmen now “time was money.” The cyclical time, time measured by cyclical call to prayers (in İzmir), and the natural time, cycles of the day and seasons (in Shanghai), now began to be replaced by linear time.⁸⁵ The clock towers were erected in the business centers of İzmir and Shanghai. The

⁸¹ Kaya, “Sondeyiş,” 263; Jos Gamble, *Shanghai in Transition* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 659.

⁸² Bergère, *Shanghai*, 73-74; Kasaba, “Civil Society,” 84.

⁸³ Nara Dillon and Jean C. Oi, eds., *At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-building in Republican Shanghai* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3-22; Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 128.

⁸⁴ Beyru, *İzmir’de Yaşam*, 186-315; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 242-84.

⁸⁵ In both empires, adoption of the solar calendar did not eliminate the use of lunar calendar; it has still been used for religious and customary events.

social time was transformed too: The compradors in Shanghai and Ottoman-Greek merchants (and other non-Muslims) in İzmir developed new life styles and business practices and differentiated themselves from the traditional merchants and elites. To a lesser extent, the wealthy, middle-class Muslims also participated in the modern social life of İzmir.⁸⁶ As Feis argued “Capital and enterprise require a political and social life fitted to their operation. Those who seek to command them are either induced to reshape their life in conformity with the necessary standard, or have their life reshaped against their will by the slow movements of events.”⁸⁷ İzmir and Shanghai’s transnational elites, opting for the former, transformed the social life in both cities and introduced all kinds of networks of transnational relations. That is why since the 19th century both cities have been considered as foreign to the indigenous culture by the traditional-conservative circles and entitled respectively as *Gavur İzmir* (Infidel İzmir) and *Hai-pai* (Shanghai-style culture degenerated and contaminated by foreigners and commercial interests). These titles refer to the cosmopolitan, commercial, cross-cultural, in short transnational, character of İzmir and Shanghai that established new values and norms against the traditional social standards. As a reflection of their local peculiarities, İzmir and Shanghai were known respectively as *Paris of Levant/Paris of the East*, *The Crown of Ionia/Queen of the Orient*, and *Pearl of the Aegean/Pearl of the Orient*.

Besides, the social demarcation in İzmir and Shanghai was no longer defined only through religion, ethnicity or regional origin but on the new categories of wealth, education, worldview and sociability acquired through economic and social transformations. Social groups were now demarcated through their lifestyles, housing, dress, property and language used.⁸⁸ New buildings were erected, and places opened to meet the requirements of the changing socioeconomic environment and modernity. The meeting places, such as clubs, associations, societies and libraries established and played a vital role in fostering transnationalization of the social life in İzmir and Shanghai by bringing together professionals and peoples from different nationalities and origins.⁸⁹ These were the places where the transnational actors met, to socialize, talk business and politics, read newspapers and magazines and dine. In İzmir: The European Casino, Merchants Club, Cercle Hellénique, Gymnase Club, Sporting Club, Hunters Club, Philharmonic Club and Masonic Lodge; In Shanghai: The Shanghai Union, Rotary, Customs, Masonic and Racing Clubs, Philharmonic Society and Royal Asiatic Society highly facilitated the all kinds of business by providing forums for transnational contacts and establishing networks. The members of these organizations were highly influential individuals of their respective communities and professions. Furthermore, both cities became the centers of printing houses publishing books, newspapers and magazines in several languages that reflected the existence of a large informed, literate and lively intellectual circles.⁹⁰ Moreover, in both cities, different nationalities and ethnic groups established their own clubs or political organizations administered by local councils.⁹¹ Besides, restaurants, hotels, ballrooms, dance floors, billiard rooms, theatres, cinemas,

⁸⁶ Christoph Neumann and Işık Tamdoğan, “Bilinmeyen Bir Cemaatin Portresi: Müslümanlar,” in *İzmir 1830-1930 Unutulmuş Bir Kent mi? Bir Osmanlı Limanından Hatıralar*, ed. Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008).

⁸⁷ Feis, *Europe*, 455.

⁸⁸ Gekas, “Compradors to Cosmopolitans?,” 4-5; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 242-84.

⁸⁹ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 94-96; Wasserstrom, “Cosmopolitan Connections;” Gekas, “Compradors to Cosmopolitans?,” 12; Beyru, *İzmir’de Yaşam*, 121-37.

⁹⁰ Beyru, *İzmir’de Yaşam*, 285-99; Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 128; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 256-57.

⁹¹ Kasaba, “Nonstate,” 213; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 93.

casinos, cafés, pubs, boutiques and shops were opened along the Frank Street and Nanjing Road respectively. Artists, musicians, dancers, singers came from elsewhere and abroad to perform their works.

Moreover, sporting activities such as horse-riding, hunting, cricket, tennis and rowing, athletics, swimming, and sporting events like, footrace, bike-race, horse and dog-racing became a part of the social-life.⁹² The vivacious nightlife coloured with parties, nightclubs, music halls, bars with singers and bands were another attractive aspect of modern, transnational İzmir and Shanghai. Women of the wealthy classes emancipated from housework and involved into social life, and schooling girls became a normal practice. Consumption of luxury items imported from Europe, became a hallmark of modernity and social distinction.⁹³ The foreigners and local wealthy classes created themselves a privileged life in both cities and those wealthy merchants who established contacts with the foreigners widened their horizons beyond İzmir and Shanghai to understand the new order of the world. The cooperation between the local administrations and business communities facilitated urban development and brought health, transportation, waterworks, and lightening services.⁹⁴ The architectural elegance of *Kordon* and *the Bund* sea/river front promenades, beautiful western style mansions, estates and villas of the wealthy strata in and around the city, again, reflected the modern, transnational images of İzmir and Shanghai.⁹⁵

Transnationalism, the Present, and the Prospects for the Future

Today, what remains in common in İzmir and Shanghai after the long century that started with the opening of both cities as free-trade ports of western and eastern Asia? Obviously, something lasting and extraordinary were created in both cities that did not disappear when transnational interactions came to a close in the 20th century. Their long transnational experiences generated today's *İzmiriot* and *Shanghaiense* modernism, which are both national, liberal, dissenter to political authority and open to the world, but as authentic as traditional Turkey and China.⁹⁶ *İzmiriot* and *Shanghaiense* people dissociate themselves from the people of other cities and see themselves as distinct and superior from their compatriots. They consider themselves as urbane, open-minded, free and relaxed coastal-style people while the others as provincial, closed, rigid, not open to novelty and change.⁹⁷

One of the strongest attributes of İzmir and Shanghai was the existence of foreigners interacting with the state and their local counterparts in several domains in a relatively liberal environment. It has been a long time since İzmir, and Shanghai lost most of their foreigner friendly environments. In time, when this was followed by the discouraging policies of respective

⁹² Bergère, *Shanghai*, 84-108; Beyru, *İzmir'de Yaşam*, 264-83; Basma Zerouali, "Sanat ve Eğlence Kavşağı," in *İzmir 1830-1930 Unutulmuş Bir Kent mi? Bir Osmanlı Limanından Hatıralar*, ed. Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008).

⁹³ Bergère, *Shanghai*, 252; Kasaba, "Compradore Bourgeoisie," 223; Beyru, *İzmir'de Yaşam*, 127.

⁹⁴ Candaş Bilsel, "Modern Bir Akdeniz Metropolüne Doğru," in *İzmir 1830-1930 Unutulmuş Bir Kent mi? Bir Osmanlı Limanından Hatıralar*, ed. Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 158-60; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 113-14.

⁹⁵ Bilsel, "Akdeniz Metropolüne Doğru," 154; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 34.

⁹⁶ Marie-Claire Bergère, "The Other China: Shanghai from 1919 to 1949," in *Shanghai: Revolution & Development in an Asian Metropolis*, ed. Christopher Howe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kaya, "Sondeyiş."

⁹⁷ Kaya, "Sondeyiş," 258; Gamble, *Shanghai in Transition*, 78.

governments toward İzmir⁹⁸ and Shanghai⁹⁹, both cities lost their attractiveness for foreign transnational actors, and the institutional underpinnings of İzmir's and Shanghai's historical and cultural transnational macrocosms disappeared.

Today, in a period of another large-scale historical transformation, and in terms of the state, society and economy, will there be any chance for İzmir and Shanghai to reinvigorate their transnational macrocosms? Would it be possible to re-establish effective communication links with the descendants of overseas comprador Chinese and Ottoman non-Muslim diasporas? And would it be realistic to encourage the one-time İzmir and Shanghai-based companies along *the Kordon-Alsancak (Punto)* and *the Bund-Nanjing Road* to return and re-invest?

In recent decades, the “transformation and rebirth” process of Shanghai have been started with the construction of modern impressive buildings and the execution of economic reforms. Since the mid-1980s a recreational plan has been implemented by the state to transform Shanghai into a commercial, financial, shipping hub and a cosmopolitan city again. The city was granted the regional leadership role and declared as the “Dragon Head” of the Yangtze region.¹⁰⁰ The city has been opened to foreign investment capital; the local authorities and business granted greater autonomy in their dealings with foreigners; and the entrepreneurs rediscovered the international markets. The Chinese government realized the transnational urban legacy of Shanghai that brings business opportunities and millions of tourists to the city.¹⁰¹ Besides, the imposing historical edifices along *the Bund* were relinquished to the former foreign owners for restoration and foreign companies have encouraged to return¹⁰² and links with the Chinese diaspora and the former compradors have been re-established. The outcome of these openings has been the return of a number of foreign companies, compradors, emergence of “free” public opinion and social life,¹⁰³ and increasing hopes for reinstating the transnational flows and the re-emergence of transnational identities. However, in a still authoritarian polity where the central authority is supervising Shanghai and highly doubtful about non-state actors, the future seems still uncertain.¹⁰⁴ In addition, the old-time vibrant and productive cultural life of the city cannot be felt anymore as Shanghai has not been able to attract enough intellectual and artistic talents. Besides, over the last few decades the arrival of millions of socially unwanted non-Shanghai migrants increased the fears of what Shanghai should not be.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the development of other coastal cities and the reality of global, entrepreneurial and autonomous Hong Kong overshadow the Shanghai's rise to its' past prominence again in the near future.¹⁰⁶

The story of İzmir diverges from Shanghai in recent decades. In the neoliberal modernization process, the state has continued to be the dominant actor, and İzmir remained a marginal town

98 Kaya, “Sondeyiş,” 258.

99 Bergère, “Other China.”

100 Gamble, *Shanghai in Transition*, 9-13.

101 Bergère, *Shanghai*, 429.

102 Gamble, *Shanghai in Transition*, 94.

103 Ibid., 108.

104 Horesh, *Shanghai*, 96; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 438.

105 Bergère, *Shanghai*, 436.

106 Bergère, *Shanghai*, 434-35; Horesh, *Shanghai*, 96, 101.

vis-a-vis the central political authority.¹⁰⁷ Unlike in Shanghai, the state have never acknowledged the one-time transnational urban legacy of İzmir to attract capital for creating wealth, and no significant regional leading economic role has been granted to İzmir to reconstruct its former international attributes.¹⁰⁸ İzmir is still the city where individuals feel themselves free in social life, but bad memories, the state and Turkey's decades-long "low-intensity democracy" has not sufficiently opened İzmir to the transnational identities and interactions yet. Corresponding to Shanghai, although the spirit of İzmir's popular entertainment and nightlife is still vibrant, the city lacks the same vibrancy in fine arts and literature. Another shared feature of İzmir with Shanghai is the inflow of millions of socially marginalized domestic and foreign emigrants from elsewhere whom generate the view of what İzmir should not be. Furthermore, the existence of Istanbul, the favourite "global" city of the state and the elites, is an important obstacle in front of the upward mobilization of İzmir towards its historical pre-eminence.

In the 21st century, although Shanghai is far ahead of İzmir in the process of catching up with transnational global-city status, both cities face an uncertain near-future. Nevertheless, Wasserstrom compares Shanghai and Budapest and emphasizes the possibility of rise to the global-city status again, referring to the "stop and start" internationalization process of these cities in history.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, according to Horesh,¹¹⁰ in order to have a chance to re-create a status reminiscent of the past vivacity, Shanghai of the 21st century needs to improve its human capital and capacity for global reach and prioritize investments in high-tech industries but not just in shipping and finance. This observation is well-grounded for İzmir too. Indeed, today İzmir and Shanghai are no longer be amply endowed with assets once they had possessed and which were difficult to replicate. Today their physical locations and historical legacies are here to stay but over the decades it seems that İzmir and Shanghai, in different degrees, have fallen behind the (domestic and foreign) qualified human agency, high-standard institutions and services that could meet the requisites of the 21st century and transform themselves into global (transnational) cities again. Perhaps, what is needed is to be able to convert the material opportunities into the present-day semi-material assets of the man-made world.

Conclusion

The Western free-trade ideology and its imperialist overseas commercial expansion in the long-19th century were built on the motto of "peaceful business". The main instrument that helps to create the "peaceful" conditions for business overseas was "transnationalism". The use of force was a measure of last resort in cases of strong resistance. Transnationalism was not a new practice, but in the 19th century it was regularized, institutionalized, and in principle sanctioned by the states. In this process the growing interest in the oceanic trade made some overseas port-cities elsewhere the focus of commercial, and thus transnational relations. In this article we analysed and compared the process of transnationalisation of İzmir and Shanghai at the political, economic and social levels in the 19th, and its eventual decline in the 20th

¹⁰⁷ Kaya, "Sondeyiş," 267-68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Wasserstrom, "Global Shanghai."

¹¹⁰ Horesh, *Shanghai*, 102.

centuries. In doing this we tried to show that transnationalism is a key concept to connect social history of both port-cities with global history and international relations.

The process of transnationalisation in İzmir and Shanghai shows that the states were one of the building blocks of transnationalism. There were no two separate state and non-states domains arrayed against each other. The states were the principal actors that prepared the stage for the formation and institutionalization of an autonomous non-state domain for transnational interactions through its diplomatic and military powers in both cities. In the long *laissez-faire* phase of liberal-imperialism transnational phenomenon became a non-military way of seeking wealth, power and status/prestige for both states and non-state actors, and an effective means for promoting political and strategic interests of the Western states.

To be named as an important transnational domain required a convenient and strategic geographical location open to the seas and possessing attractive natural assets to be exploited by the states and non-state actors; and also, a form of “liberal” administration. In this respect, İzmir and Shanghai possessed such attributes and had long before becoming centers for commercial interactions. Before the 19th century they were cosmopolitan port-cities already but not *laissez-faire* transnational domains proper. It was primarily the victory of free trade imperialism and ideology over the monopolistic, chartered companies authorized by the royal courts and the increasing volume of private oceanic trade and growing population of both cities through immigrations that transformed İzmir and Shanghai into proper transnational macrocosms.

The social and cultural aspects of *laissez-faire* transnationalism and imperialism were its “soft powers” decisively contributed to its consolidation and the social transformation in both cities and left behind a legacy to the present. The establishment of modern hospitals, schools, libraries, sporting and cultural clubs and associations, vibrant nightlife, emancipation of women, etc., that it brought in its baggage were the part and parcel of transnationalism that highly attracted local people and facilitated all kinds of transnational interactions.

On the other hand, it becomes clear that transnationalism has had the capability of transforming the power relations and thus social hierarchy in the penetrated societies by reorganizing the political and societal relations between the local non-state actors themselves, and between the foreign and local transnational actors, and also between them and the states. In İzmir and Shanghai, the penetration of transnationalism upgraded the status of formerly weak non-state groups in the social hierarchy *vis-a-vis* the traditional groups. Also, they simultaneously became able to exploit the support of the foreign powers, limit the sphere of activity of the foreign non-state actors, and controlled the level of cooperation for a long period.

The *laissez-faire* transnationalism and imperialism were an outcome of the world-scale historical change started after the Napoleonic Wars and Industrial Revolution. However, the nature of transnationalism itself too changed as this transformation evolved into different forms in later stages and eventually brought its own end. The American Civil War and its ending; the world economic depression; the wars and the increasing indebtedness of the Ottoman and Chinese empires to great powers and the ensuing institutionalized foreign control on the imperial public finances were the important global and domestic developments that significantly reshaped the character of transnational interactions between foreign and domestic non-state actors and between them and the states. In this process, social hierarchies were reshuffled between the local and foreign transnational actors in İzmir and Shanghai at the expense of the former.

However, the process of the transformation of traditional structures; establishing control over the imperial treasuries; changing social hierarchies among the local elites; and the introduction of new values and ideologies gradually paved the way for the penetration of nationalism, protectionism, anti-foreign movements in the Ottoman and Chinese empires, and then led to wars, defeats, foreign invasions, collapse of pluri-cultural empires, establishment of new polities and eventually the end of transnational macrocosms of İzmir and Shanghai which built in the dictum of *laissez-faire* liberalism: the “peaceful business”.

Today, both İzmir and Shanghai are trying to upgrade their status to the global level once again and Shanghai is way ahead of İzmir in this process. In the 19th century, more or less, they possessed the material and semi-material global-city requirements of their time. However, in the early 21st century, in the face of strong nominees for this status in Turkey and China, the future seems uncertain for both cities. Although both cities still retain their geographical and physical (material) assets, probably the main problems are, though at different levels for İzmir and Shanghai, having not enough (local/foreign) human resources, infrastructural, institutional and technological (semi-material) assets, and compared to other nominees having attract lesser global interest required by the 21st century transnational/global-city status.

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